THE TEMPLE OF LIBERTY AS FORT KNOX

Abstract
In response to security threats in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. Capitol was made less
accessible to the public through a series of security upgrades, including an expansion of the
Capitol Police force, new visitor registration programs, and the construction and implementation
of physical barriers in and around the Capitol building. However, increased safety for members
and staff has had consequences for the Capitol building’s important symbolic representation.
Previous inquiries into the design and use of capital cities have revealed that these places are
symbolically important as embodiments of public values. In this article, the authors argue that
by repeatedly prioritizing public displays of security over public access, Congress has
inadvertently contributed to the alienation Americans feel from their government, with
implications for January 6th and beyond.
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We have built no national temples but the Capitol; we consult no common oracle but the
Constitution.
—Representative Rufus Choate, 1833
Previous studies and observer reflections have identified the U.S. Capitol building as both the
physical embodiment of the Republic, a place in which representatives from geographic
subdivisions within every state come together to debate public policy issues and make national
laws, and as the symbolic representation of democracy itself. Examples abound: The Library of
Congress’s online exhibit about the Capitol building describes it as a “temple of liberty,”1 as
does historian Pamela Scott (1995) in her book of the same name. Mueller et al. (2017) wrote,
“The U.S. Capitol Dome is one of the most recognizable structures in the world and stands as a
symbol of democracy” (p. 46). On May 14, 2021, Speaker of the U.S House of Representatives
Nancy Pelosi wrote to her Democratic Party colleagues, “The Capitol of the United States has
always been a welcoming beacon of democracy for the American people and to the world.”2 The
website of the Architect of the Capitol (n.d.), whose office is charged with the preservation and
upkeep of the Capitol and its surrounding environment, describes the building as “a monument
not only to its builders but also to the American people and their government” (para. 3).
The notion of the Capitol building as both the physical and symbolic locus of American
democracy exists for good reason. Pierre L’Enfant’s plan for the City of Washington, whether by
design (Young, 1966) or by happenstance (Berg, 2007), enshrined the major principles of the
U.S. Constitution—specifically federalism and separation of powers—in the design of the
nation’s capital, with the Capitol building occupying the highest point in the city. As Berg
(2007), wrote, “In L’Enfant’s plan the home of Congress took center stage” (p. 112), just as the
Constitution’s framers intended Congress to be the first branch of government.
Much has been written about the Capitol as both a physical and symbolic embodiment of
American democratic principles. The ways the building has been physically changed over time to
accommodate a growing nation have also been well documented (e.g., Allen, 2005). Some recent
scholarship has begun telling the story of the anti-democratic elements (Goldman-Petri, 2021) of
the Capitol’s foreboding architecture and how the construction and adornment of the building
depended nearly entirely on the labor of enslaved people (Monteiro, 2020). These accounts make
clear that the design, construction, expansion, and work within the Capitol have always reflected
the sociopolitical circumstances in the United States at large.
Thus, it is surprising that little attention has been given to how changes to the Capitol’s
security apparatus over the last quarter century have shaped the public’s orientation to its most
visible and public symbol of democracy and to the work that occurs within it. This is true even as
scholars in fields as diverse as architecture, philosophy, history, and sociology have considered
how both physical structures and the domestic security state can affect individuals’ orientations
toward government and toward one another (Geenens & Tinnevelt, 2009). The Capitol building
has been given short shrift, too, in analyses of the impact of enhanced security throughout the
nation’s capital more broadly, which have tended to focus on the geographic area closest to the
White House. For example, in her study of the National Mall, Benton-Short (2007 noted that “the
1
2

https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/uscapitol/
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nation’s capital has become a fortress city peppered with bollards, bunkers, and barriers” (p.
433), and Hoffman et al. (2002) derided the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue in the mid-1990s as
being “at odds with the core values of an open and democratic society” (p. 43). Yet, there has
been little academic discussion of the impact of an increasingly militarized and securitized
Capitol complex on the ability of citizens to engage in the work of democracy or on the capacity
of Congress to serve the function of connecting citizens to their government.
In this article, we discuss the ways the physical space and symbolic meaning of the U.S.
Capitol have changed as a consequence of an increased focus on security, and consider how
these changes may have contributed to the events of January 6, 2021. Ramped up security at the
Capitol—which began in earnest in 1998 after two U.S. Capitol Police officers were killed by a
mentally ill gunman who opened fire at a security checkpoint and made his way into the corridor
housing the Majority Whip’s office suite—has intended to prevent incursions into the building
and, by extension, to protect the building, those who work within it, and even democracy itself
from harm. Here, however, we suggest the possibility that these changes have further contributed
to putting “government at a distance and out of sight” (Young, 1996, p. 13) from the public that
the institution is intended to serve. Using theories of democratic space as the foundation of our
analysis, we chronicle the changes over time to the Capitol security apparatus, consider the ways
a more secure Capitol is also a less democratic space, and discuss the implications both for the
January 6, 2021, insurrection and for restoring the public’s sense of political efficacy and civic
community.
The Concept of Democratic Space
Although political theorists have long considered issues of space and place, policy
scholars have largely avoided wading into normative questions about the connection between
space and political outcomes. John Parkinson, a British political theorist and policy scholar, is an
exception. His recent work has considered the importance of public space and the implications of
trading openness for elite safety. As Parkinson (2009a) noted,
Issues of public space in general matter for many reasons: it is important for people to
have space in which to interact with their elected representatives, for one, and the present
climate in which security concerns override almost all other values has seen a significant
decrease in the accessibility of public space and public officials. (p. 5)
However, what constitutes public space has been contested. Goodsell (2003) identified
three primary disciplinary sources of the divergent meanings of the concept of public space:
political and moral philosophers, urban planners, and architectural analysts. Political
philosophers and democratic theorists, following Arendt (1958) and Habermas (1989), have
conceptualized public space (often described as the “public sphere”) as a social realm for
essential public discourse, the threats to which are the primary focus of their analyses. More
recently, scholars have considered the democratic potential of internet space and the ways the
architecture, boundaries, rules, and processes of online communities enhance and inhibit
opportunities for democratic discourse (Forrestal, 2017). The potential consequences of
technology for public space are significant enough that some scholars have gone so far as to
advocate a “farewell to the old model of a monumental public space” (Hénaff & Strong, 2001, p.
230). By contrast, urban planners often speak of physical (i.e., non-metaphoric) public space,
usually referring to urban sites intended for public use and for the development of interpersonal
connection and opportunity for expression. For these scholars, the transformation of traditional
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public spaces into commercial and privately owned gathering sites, such as shopping malls,
threatens the capacity of these spaces to perform their social function, one that cannot be simply
moved online without deleterious effects. For architectural interpreters, the unit of analysis is,
most frequently, specific buildings, usually explicitly identified with the state. These scholars
pay particular attention to how the building or structure they are studying “expresses historical or
regime values, affects the conduct of contemporary users, and projects images for consumption
by passing viewers” (Goodsell, 2003, pp. 367–368). Although these bodies of literature glance
off one another occasionally, we find that there has been little integration of their different
approaches and little attention to the concerns they have raised.
Seeking to provide a unified definition of public space, Parkinson (2013) focused on the
ways a space can be public, identifying three nonexclusive possibilities: Space can be openly
accessible; it can be a space of common concern, either through use of resources or effects; or it
can be used for “performing public, political roles” (p. 440). This third category perhaps best
describes the U.S. Capitol, within which legislators perform their essential democratic roles
through the making of claims and decisions, the representation of multiple perspectives, and
debate and deliberation about matters of common concern. However, these acts alone do not per
se make the Capitol or other legislatures democratic spaces; insofar as they occur in the absence
of attentive publics, a fundamental democratic element is unfulfilled. Thus, democratic space
requires both the performance of these public roles and access to that performance by the
nonperformers (i.e., the nonpoliticians), whose ability to engage with legislators in their work,
not merely through symbols, is essential. As Parkinson (2009b) explained, “On this account,
public space matters because of the functional necessity of physical arenas for democratic
action” (p. 102), among which action is the crucial role of the audience witnessing the making of
public claims and collective decisions as well as observing the decision makers (p. 111). Thus,
democratic space requires not only the presence of the audience, but also “an encouragement of
access, a muting of authority, a minimization of barriers, unofficial as well as official staging,
and an attempt to create conditions favorable to deliberation” (Goodsell, 2003, p. 22)
The Capitol Security Apparatus: Then and Now
Democratic space inside the legislature thus requires both the opportunity for such an
audience to fulfill its role in the performance of democracy as well as meaningful access to the
building, galleries, and committee rooms where the work of legislating—and democracy—
occurs. Put more succinctly, in order for public spaces to be democratic spaces, they must be
open and accessible to the people. The ability of the public to access the Capitol building and the
national legislature it houses is the root of the building’s symbolic power. As Strand and Lang
(2013) wrote, “Congress has traditionally been the branch of government nearest to the people,
and the building has been relatively open to reflect that.” Yet, when the public space in question
is also the forum for the creation of law, as is the case with the U.S. Capitol complex, questions
of access are inextricably intertwined with perceptions of influence. Thus, when the Capitol
building and the U.S. Congress are inaccessible to the public, there are consequences both for
public perception of the representative nature of government and for the actual practice of
representation. Notably, at the time of this writing, in September 2021, the U.S. Capitol has been
closed to visitors for 18 months as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing worries of
violence against the building and its members (Mascaro, 2021).
Even when the Capitol is fully open to the public, access is tightly regulated, with visitors
subject to scanning, searches, and limitations on items that can be carried into the building (U.S.
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Capitol Visitors Center, n.d.). This has been true at least since 1998, in the aftermath of the
killing of the two U.S. Capitol Police officers. As Figure 1 reveals, the events of September 11,
2001, accelerated the fortification of the Capitol building; the terrorists who hijacked United
Flight 93 almost certainly planned to strike the Capitol’s dome (U.S. Senate, n.d.). As Strand and
Lang (2013) explained, “As time has gone on, the institution has added additional security
measures in response to attacks and threats.”
Figure 1
A Security Checkpoint at the U.S. Capitol Building Following the September 11, 2001, Terrorist
Attacks

Note. Source: CQ Roll Call Photograph Collection, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division,
Washington, DC 20540. (Scott J. Ferrell, photographer.) No restrictions on use. Available online at
https://www.loc.gov/item/2019645821/.

Figure 2 briefly summarizes the major security threats and reactions that have affected
the U.S. Capitol building in the last quarter century. Rather than offering an exhaustive list of
every incident that has occurred at the Capitol, the figure identifies and briefly describes those
events that led to substantive changes in the security measures used to protect the Capitol. Of
note, it was not until the early 1970s that entry to the Capitol required undergoing security
screening and not until more than a decade later that staff members began to be required to wear
identification.
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Figure 2
Significant Security Events and Substantive Changes at the U.S. Capitol

Note. Sources: CNN.com (1998), Strand & Lang (2013), Tully-McManiss & McKinless (2018), Grisales (2021),
U.S. Capitol Police (n.d.) website.

Perhaps no timeframe was more important to the Capitol’s security apparatus than the
period between 1995 and 2001, when in the aftermath of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P.
eJournal of Public Affairs, 11(1)

64

THE TEMPLE OF LIBERTY AS FORT KNOX

Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the National Park Service, Secret Service, and U.S.
Capitol Police all took steps to limit vehicle access to government buildings and national
monuments. As Forgey (2005) wrote,
Make no mistake, it is the possibility of truck bomb attacks such as [Timothy] McVeigh’s
[on the Murrah Federal Building], and not other potential terrorist weapons, that is
primarily responsible for the concrete barriers, construction fences, and other stuff that
today make Washington’s monumental core so ugly and unfriendly. (p. 146)
“Out of Sight and at a Distance”
It has not only been specific security threats that have led to a reduction in access to the
Capitol. Architectural historian Richard Guy Wilson (2000) described the “historicization” of the
Capitol that began in the 1950s and shifted the building from a “structure capable of extension
and remodeling” to “a venerable historical landmark that must be preserved” (p. 139). For
Wilson, the effect of this has been to make the work of Congress recede from view. Whether one
agrees with Wilson that seeing the Capitol symbolically leads people to have difficulty seeing it
as an active workplace, or with Parkinson (2012) that the Capitol becoming a less active
workspace has led the public to see it as primarily a historic and symbolic site, the consequences
are clear. If “it is easier to think of the building in terms of tourism and less in terms of
democratic citizenship [this] makes the securitization of the building easier” (Parkinson, 2012, p.
115).
Security planning inevitably begins with an implicit assessment of both the “what” and
“whom” of the threat to be guarded against. While the securitization of the U.S. Capitol (and
other federal buildings in Washington, DC) did not start with the Oklahoma City bombing, it did
transform that assessment by shifting its focus to be “increasingly directed at American citizens”
(Upton, 2021). The implications of the resulting “landscape of fear” extend far beyond aesthetic
objections to Jersey barriers or concerns about convenience. Rather, the reconfiguration of the
nation’s capital city and its Capitol building has effectively situated the citizenry as a threat to
the democratic process rather than as the collective on whose behalf it operates and whose active
presence is essential to its operation.
Take, for example, the process of entering the U.S. Capitol as a visitor in the years prior
to 2008. Although bag checks and magnetometers were present at every door, one had many
options for entering the building, including the possibility of climbing the west steps to “an
entrance once carefully designed to convey that this monument to democracy was indeed open
and accessible to all” (Vale, 2005, p. 41). If the House or the Senate were in session and one
wanted to observe the proceedings, they would seek a Gallery pass from their representative or
senator, or from the visitor’s desk located on the first floor of the building and follow signage to
the entrances to the galleries.
Today, however, “a visitor’s experience of the building starts not with the debating
chambers, but with an exhibition and things to consume. It is a tourism experience” (Parkinson,
2013, p. 445). Entrance to the building is severely restricted. Visitors enter underground below
the east front plaza, far from the building’s intended portal. They check all backpacks, large
bags, and metal jewelry, submit to a scan of all remaining items, queue to obtain the required
sticker needed for entry, then queue again to wait to be admitted to see the required video
presentation. If visitors are too early to line up for their assigned admission time, the Visitor
Center’s website instructs them to “begin [their] Capitol experience … by visiting our temporary
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exhibits, perusing our Gift Shops or dining in our Restaurant.”3 Following the video presentation,
visitors are handed headsets and are asked to choose one of five queues, each of which becomes
a tour group so large that the headsets are required to be worn in order to ensure that the guide
can be heard. Tours are restricted to the historic areas such as the Crypt, the Old Supreme Court
chamber, the Rotunda, and National Statuary Hall. Visiting either the House or Senate Gallery
still requires obtaining separate passes, but now those passes must be obtained through request to
one’s representative or senator. The Gallery pass itself admits visitors to view floor proceedings
but only after they submit again to supplemental security measures and check all cameras,
phones, and other recording devices. Visitors are then reminded of the strict rules of behavior
expected while in the Gallery, which include not talking, reacting to speeches or votes, or
otherwise making sounds that could be disruptive to the business taking place below. Thus,
“acting as a public citizen in a public gallery is dealt with severely ... with the lower status cues
reinforced by the strict access and behaviour controls enforced by guards, physical barriers, more
subtle design elements, or all three” (Parkinson, 2013, p. 446).
Tourists, by definition, are guests, visitors whose continued presence is contingent on
their compliance with the rules of the sites they visit. Casting the Capitol as first and foremost a
site for tourists (e.g., restricting access by requiring tickets, entry through a single, highly
controlled portal), means that citizens wishing to observe and engage the work of legislating are
reminded that they are only contingently present, without any right to presence or participation.
This tourist model of access privileges individuals acting as consumers over “purposive
publics—people and groups of people with certain kinds of public purposes” (Parkinson, 2013,
p. 447), thus subordinating the democratic values of accessibility, participation, and
accountability to that of security. Importantly, by casting the Capitol as a monument and
historical site rather than as a functioning representative forum, it has become possible to inhibit,
if not outright prevent, citizens from engaging in essential democratic functions in that space.
Of course, while unfettered access to legislators and legislative proceedings is impractical
if the work of Congress is to occur, the significant barriers to the presence and participation of
those being represented signal that the work occurring in the “people’s branch” is best
accomplished with those people kept at a distance. Revealingly, at a September 10, 2002, hearing
on post-9/11 security, Representative Steny Hoyer acknowledged that the post-9/11 security
measures rendered the Capitol “a little less open, a little less hospitable to those who own this
Capitol” but added that these measures were necessary to “protect the people who come to this
building to participate in democracy here in their Capitol” (House Committee on Administration,
2002). Implied in Representative Hoyer’s statement is the notion that only certain credentialed
participants are deserving of full access rights to the building: representatives and senators, staff
members, lobbyists, and the media. Implicit as well in Hoyer’s observation is the idea that
restricting rank-and-file members of the public from entering the Capitol is somehow not a
restriction on public participation in the democratic process. Hoyer’s sentiments support Vale’s
(2005) conclusion that, “all too often, ‘securing public space’ means securing space from the
public, rather than for it” (p. 41).
Conclusion
Nearly a half century ago, Marcus Raskin (1976) argued that the U.S. national security
state is inimical to the rule of law because it sets up national security agencies in opposition to
3
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citizens. A similar dynamic is at work here. Having relegated the public to outsider status in the
lawmaking process and having imposed stringent security measures to ensure that the public
cannot do harm to those who are entitled to be in the Capitol building, Capitol complex security
measures have ensured that Congress and the public are both literally and metaphorically
opposed to one another. After all, “national symbols are constructed by patterns of use and habit
as much as deliberate association” (Parkinson, 2012, p. 195). Therefore, it becomes all the more
essential to consider those patterns of use and habit and the purposes they serve.
To the degree that the securitization of the Capitol has meaningfully increased actual
security of the complex, one might consider the trade-off between preserving democratic space
and protecting the building and the people within it worth the cost. However, it is profoundly
unclear that the ever-more-severe ratcheting up of security measures has, in fact, resulted in
greater safety. On the contrary, many of these measures appear to be “security theater,” a term
coined by Bruce Schneier (2009) to describe “the security measures that make people feel more
secure without doing anything to actually improve their security.” Yet, this description implies
that security theater is essentially benign, neither contributing to security, nor causing harm. If,
however, the security measures taken are more than falsely reassuring, if they are both reflective
and constructive of a legislature and a public deeply alienated from one another, the effects are
far more significant. Consider, for example, the Task Force 1-6 Capitol Security Review (U.S.
Speaker, 2021) commissioned by Nancy Pelosi. The report recommends more than 850 additions
to the Capitol Police force (which is already larger than the municipal police departments in
Atlanta, St. Louis, New Orleans, or Denver), the re-establishment of a mounted unit and
increased numbers of explosive detecting dogs, the creation of dedicated Civil Disturbance Units
to surveil and respond to First Amendment-related activities, additional screening vestibules for
the north and south entrances, and a “hardening” (p. 10) of all Capitol entrances.
The implications of this are bleak. There is no indication that the events of January 6th are
likely to spur a reckoning about the ways a more open and accessible Capitol building would
encourage more constructively engaged and appropriate civic participation. On the contrary,
“each incident, then, justifies an increase in the control of public use of ostensibly public spaces”
(Upton, 2021). Indeed, in a January 26, 2021, House hearing on the storming of the Capitol,
Yogananda D. Pittman, the acting head of the Capitol Police, told representatives,
I do not believe there was any preparations that would have allowed for an open campus
in which lawful protesters could exercise their First Amendment right to free speech and
at the same time prevented the attack on Capitol grounds that day. (as cited in Upton,
2021)
She argued instead that “to prevent a similar incursion in the future, lawmakers will have to
sacrifice public access to the building to bolster security measures.” Yet, as it sacrifices public
access to the Capitol in the name of security, Congress must begin to take seriously the
possibility that the profound alienation such measures engender is as much a threat to the
practice of democracy as the attacks they seek to prevent.
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